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Children’s Understanding of Social Rules
and Social Status
Gavin Nobes and Chris Pawson
University of East London, UK
Children’s understanding of social rules and authority was investigated by ask-
ing 4–9 year-olds (N  129) about stories in which the status (adult or child) of
rule inventors, transgressors, and changers was varied. The rules were conven-
tions invented by adults and by children, cultural conventions, and morals. Judg-
ments of transgressions and, in particular, alterations, were influenced by status
as well as domain: Children considered transgressions and alterations by chil-
dren less permissible than by adults, and adult-invented conventions less alter-
able than child-invented conventions. Alterations of adults’ rules by children
were thought almost as illegitimate as alterations of morals. Other influences on
judgments included children’s age, story content, and whether a convention was
cultural or newly invented. These findings suggest an explanation of Piaget’s
findings that differs from his own.
Piaget (1932/1968) investigated children’s conceptions of rules by
interviewing them about their games. He found that young children
said that game rules were invented by adults (or God) and that it would
be wrong to try to change them. This finding led Piaget to characterize
young children as having “heteronomous” conceptions of rules: They
believe all rules to be sacred, universal, and unalterable. According to
this account, young children do not understand that the conventional
rules (such as prohibitions of talking in class and wearing inappropri-
ate clothes) that regulate social institutions are invented through con-
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sensus, differ from place to place, and are alterable. Piaget proposed
that, to young children, conventions are indistinguishable from morals
(for example, prohibitions of hitting and stealing), which are universal,
independent of consensus, and immutable.
Piaget sought to explain his findings in social psychological and
cognitive developmental terms. He argued that children have a “moral-
ity of constraint” that stems from their “unilateral respect” for their
elders. As a result, he claimed, children accept adults’ rules without
question. Piaget thought that children are unaware of the social pro-
cesses that lead to the invention or change of conventions because,
owing both to their inferior social status and their egocentrism, they
cannot participate in the negotiation of these rules. It is only when chil-
dren become less egocentric that they are able to negotiate rules with
mutually respecting peers. For Piaget, it is through this negotiation
with equals that autonomy emerges as children begin to realize the
nature of social conventions and to make the moral/conventional dis-
tinction. In the case of game rules, he believed, this first occurs at
about 12 years.
Recent research has demonstrated that children’s understanding of
rules and of authority is more sophisticated than Piaget believed. The
“domain theorists” (e.g., Nucci & Nucci, 1982; Nucci & Turiel, 1993;
Smetana, 1981; Tisak & Jankowski, 1996; Turiel, 1983) have shown
that, even at the age of 3 years (Smetana & Braeges, 1990), children’s
understanding of rules is differentiated: Children distinguish between
domains of rules, such as morals and conventions. These researchers
have told children stories involving transgressions of moral and con-
ventional rules and asked them to judge the actions by a number of cri-
teria that distinguish the two domains. They have reported, for exam-
ple, that children recognize that conventions are relative and
contingent on rules and authority, whereas morals are universal and
noncontingent. Further support for the domain theorists’ account
comes from observations of children’s social interactions (e.g., Nucci &
Turiel, 1978) and studies of children’s judgments of actual transgres-
sions (e.g., Smetana, Schlagman, & Walsh Adams, 1993) and justifica-
tions of judgments (e.g., Tisak & Turiel, 1988).
Recent research has also demonstrated that children do not have
the unitary orientation toward adults that Piaget proposed, since their
understanding of authority is also differentiated. As with their concep-
tions of social rules, children’s judgments of the legitimacy of author-
ity are influenced by the domain of directives (Laupa & Turiel, 1986).
The knowledge or competence of individuals who issue directives is
also an important factor in these judgments (e.g., Laupa, 1991):
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1 Most authorities encountered by children in hierarchical organizations combine sev-
eral authority attributes because they are adults who have social position, competence, and
experience.
Younger children (but not necessarily adolescents) consider the direc-
tives of knowledgeable individuals to be more legitimate than those of
incompetent individuals. Furthermore, at least for older children
(Laupa, 1991), judgments of authority are strongly influenced by the
social position—such as school principal or parent—of the people
who give directives (e.g., Laupa & Turiel, 1986). And children under-
stand that the jurisdiction of authorities extends only to certain con-
texts: Children judge teachers’ authority to be more legitimate within
school than at home, and parents’ authority to be less legitimate at
school, or at a friend’s house, than at home (Laupa & Turiel, 1993;
Laupa, Turiel, & Cowan, 1995; Tisak, Crane-Ross, Tisak, & Maynard,
2000).
Contrary to Piaget’s claim, children acknowledge that legitimate
authorities are not necessarily adult. Children accept peers in authority
positions at school when the position has been delegated by a teacher
(Laupa, 1991; Laupa & Turiel, 1986). They even recognize the author-
ity of a younger sibling when this authority has been delegated by
adults (Laupa, 1995). However, some studies point to adulthood being
influential, especially in the judgments of younger children (Laupa,
1995; Laupa & Turiel, 1986).
In this study we investigated how children’s conceptions of rules
and authority interact to influence children’s social judgments. It was
not our aim to investigate further which of the components of author-
ity, such as social position, competence, experience, and adulthood, are
important in children’s social judgments. Instead, we explored the pos-
sibility that children’s conceptions of morals and conventions are influ-
enced by whether the inventors, transgressors, and changers of these
rules are adults, who have relatively high authority status, or children,
whose authority status is relatively low.1 For this reason, “adult status”
refers here to adults who have at least one authority attribute, and
“child status” to children who have none.
It seems likely on intuitive grounds that children’s conceptions of
rules are influenced by adult/child status. For example, children might
be expected to say that adults can usually transgress and alter rules
more easily than can children. Also, children are likely to think that
rules that are invented by adults are generally less violable, contingent,
and alterable than rules that are invented by children. That is, depend-
ing on the status of the individuals involved in inventing, transgressing,
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2 These figures relate to familiar rules and are similar to those for unfamiliar rules.
3 Piaget’s examples of interviews (pp. 46–76) show that he asked some children whether
they (the children) could change the rules, while others were invited to comment on changes
proposed by the adult researcher. But Piaget does not report whether his interviewees
responded differently to these different questions, nor on which responses he based his con-
clusions.
and altering, children might judge rules to be more, or less, absolute.
These would be rational and realistic judgments based on children’s
everyday interactions with adult authorities in social organizations. It
is even possible that differences in status between rule inventors and
transgressors will lead children to say that some transgressions and alter-
ations of conventions are as impermissible as transgressions and alter-
ations of morals: That is, in these circumstances, they might not make
the moral/conventional distinction.
There is some evidence that children’s conceptions of rules are
influenced in this way. Davidson, Turiel, and Black (1983) asked chil-
dren, “Is it all right to change this rule?” and found that 18% said that
morals could be changed, compared with 89% who said that conven-
tions could be changed. In contrast, when the question was, “Could
the children get this rule changed?” the proportion of children who
replied that they could was 7% for both morals and conventional
rules.2 By the criterion of alterability, then, and when the attempted
changes were made by children, the respondents no longer distin-
guished between morals and conventions.
To investigate the influence of adult/child status, it is necessary to
compare children’s judgments of rules that are invented by adults
and children and transgressed and altered by adults and children.
This has not been done in previous research because investigators
have focused almost exclusively on children’s conceptions of adults’
rules and authority (even if it is delegated to children) in adult-led
social organizations such as schools and families. Children have not
been asked about rules that children invent for themselves (Nobes,
1999). Furthermore, children have been asked about situations and
actions in which the subjects of authority, and the transgressors of
rules, have almost invariably been children, rather than adults.
Piaget, too, asked children only about the origins and alterability of
elders’ rules.3
In this study we systematically varied the adult/child status of the
inventors, transgressors and changers of conventional rules. In addi-
tion to adult-invented and child-invented conventions, morals and cul-
tural conventions—the familiar, culture-wide conventions that govern,
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4 Previous researchers have not distinguished between conventions that are newly
invented and local—used here to compare the influence of rule invention by adults and by
children—and cultural conventions. In order to compare our findings with theirs, it was
therefore necessary to include all three kinds of conventions: adult invented, child invented,
and cultural.
for example, the ways in which we dress and eat—were also included.4
This design enabled us to assess the influence on children’s judgments
of the adult/child status of the inventors, transgressors, and changers
of rules, to compare this with the influence of social domain, and to
explore the possibility that children conceive of cultural and newly
invented conventions differently.
It was predicted that children would distinguish between morals
and conventions by judging morals to be less alterable and their trans-
gression less permissible than all three kinds of convention. And, in the
absence of a rule, or of an authority’s knowledge, moral transgressions
would still be judged to be wrong, whereas conventional transgressions
would not. These are the criterion judgments of alterability, permissi-
bility, rule contingency, and authority contingency, respectively.
It was also predicted that children would be sensitive to the status
of the people who invented, transgressed, or changed the rules. Thus,
children were expected to judge rules less absolute—less violable, alter-
able, rule contingent, and authority contingent—when transgressed or
altered by adults than by children. In addition, it was predicted that
adult-invented conventions would be considered more absolute than
child-invented conventions. It was also expected that children’s judg-
ments of transgressions and alterations of cultural and adult-invented
conventions would be similar, because both are adults’ rules.
Since older children tend to have a more differentiated understand-
ing of social rules, authority, and status than younger children (e.g.,
Laupa, 1995; Shantz, 1982; Tisak et al., 2000; Tisak & Turiel, 1988), it
was expected that older children would distinguish between actions
more clearly than younger children on the grounds of both social
domain and the status of the inventors, changers, and transgressors.
Another aim of the study was to investigate the influence of story
content on children’s judgments. It is likely that transgressions and
alterations of rules of the same source (moral, cultural conventional,
adult-invented conventional, or child-invented conventional) are
judged differently because, for example, the consequences of transgres-
sions of some rules are considered more serious than of others. If this
is the case then, depending on researchers’ choice of rules, there is
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5 Use of multiple stories of each story type also reduced the likelihood of the content of
individual stories (as opposed to rule source and agent status) influencing the criterion judg-
ment scores of individual children or of the sample. In addition, since each child’s criterion
judgment scores for each story type were derived from judgments of two or three stories, vari-
ance and hence statistical power were increased.
potential for differences in judgments being wrongly attributed to dif-
ferences in domains, or in status, when actually they reflect differences
in story contents. For this reason, children were asked about several
stories involving transgressions and alterations of each source of rule.5
Method
Sample
The participants were 129 children from six primary schools in Lon-
don. There were 21 boys and 20 girls aged 4–5 years (M  5.23, SD 
.39), 19 boys and 21 girls aged 6–7 years (M  7.22, SD  .67), and 22
boys and 26 girls aged 8–9 years (M  8.85 years, SD  .60). Seventy-
two (55.8%) children were white, 33 (25.6%) South Asian, 19 (14.7%)
African, and 5 (3.9%) Black Caribbean.
Design
Each child was asked questions about stories in which rules of four
different sources—moral, cultural conventional, adult-invented conven-
tional, and child-invented conventional—were broken and changed
either by adult or child agents. There were, then, eight rule-source/agent-
status story types: moral/adult, moral/child, cultural conventional
/adult, cultural conventional/child, adult-invented conventional/adult,
adult-invented conventional/child, child-invented conventional
/adult, child-invented conventional/child. Rule source and agent sta-
tus were the two within-participants IVs, with four and two levels,
respectively.
There were also two between-participants IVs—age group (4–5
years, 6–7 years, and 8–9 years) and gender. The questions asked about
each story elicited four criterion judgments: permissibility, authority
contingency, rule contingency, and alterability. These were the DVs.
Stimuli
To ensure that each child could have three stories of each type, and
that no child heard each story more than once, there were 24 stories
involving rule transgressions. These rules were drawn from previous
research (e.g., Blair, 1995; Nucci, 1981; Sanderson & Siegal, 1988;
Smetana & Braeges, 1990; Smetana et al., 1993; Tisak & Turiel, 1988;
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Turiel, 1983). The six stories involving transgressions of moral rules
were stealing money, pushing, not helping, telling someone else’s
secret, not sharing, and falsely blaming. There were also six stories
involving transgressions of cultural conventional rules: going naked in
public, using the wrong lavatory, removing shoes in a restaurant, male
wearing nail polish, not saying “please,” and swearing.
Finally, there were twelve stories in which newly invented conven-
tional rules were transgressed: sitting in the wrong place on a bus, not
wearing a club’s colors, not doing a job as arranged, calling the team
captain the wrong name, not counting in hide-and-seek, not replacing
crayons in the right place, not swimming a required distance, not par-
ticipating in a pregame ritual, talking in a quiet place, using the wrong
bowl to feed the dog, playing indoors in fine weather, and wearing the
wrong color shoes to school.
Each moral and cultural conventional story had two versions—
one in which the agent of transgression and alteration was an adult,
and in the other, a child. For example, the adult (and, in parentheses,
the child) version of the moral story about stealing went as follows:
This is Mrs. Foster (Amanda). Mrs. Foster is a grown-up (Amanda
is a girl about your age). One day Mrs. Foster (Amanda) notices some-
one has left a purse on the table. Mrs. Foster (Amanda) opens the
purse and finds five pounds. She takes the five pounds.
Each newly invented conventional story had four versions, in
which the inventors were either adult or child, and the transgressor and
changer were either adult or child. For example, the adult (and child)
versions of the story about being quiet in a corner of the classroom
went as follows:
At Lancaster Primary School, all the teachers at the school (chil-
dren in a class) made a rule that in the corner of the classroom by the
window there is no talking allowed by the teachers or the children. One
day, Mrs. Beaton, who is a teacher (June, who is a girl in the class), was
sitting in the quiet corner. She looked out of the window and said,
“Look at the birds in that tree.”
Procedure
Story versions were systematically allocated so that each child
could have 24 different stories, and approximately equal numbers of
each version of each story were presented within each age group.
Each child was interviewed individually in a quiet room in his or
her school. The researcher first gave a brief introduction and explana-
tion of the task and then presented the child’s stories in random order.
Having ensured that the child understood, each story was followed by
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6 These questions were used by Smetana and Braeges (1990).
questions about four criterion judgments. First, to assess judgments of
the permissibility of the actions, participants were asked “Was it OK
for X to have done that?” and, if the answer was “no,” “Was it bad or
very bad?” Then, to assess judgments of the authority contingency and
rule contingency of the actions, they were asked “If no one had seen X
doing that, would it have been OK?” and “What if no one had told X
the rule about not doing that, would it have been OK?”6 The next ques-
tion was “If all the children in X’s class [or grown-ups where X works]
wanted to change the rule so that [the rule was changed locally], would
that be OK?” to assess judgments of the alterability of the rules. If the
answer to this question was “yes,” they were asked “How would they
do that?” to ensure it had been understood.
Each interview lasted 20–30 minutes. When children showed signs
of reduced attention their interviews were cut short and continued dur-
ing the researcher’s next visit to the school, between 1 and 5 days later.
All participants responded to a minimum of 2 stories of each type (i.e.,
a minimum total of 16 stories), and 34 (26.4%) children answered the
questions to all 24 stories. All interviews were tape-recorded.
Scoring
Participants’ judgments of the permissibility of each action were
coded 0 (OK), 1 (bad), or 2 (very bad). Each of their judgments of rule
contingency, authority contingency, and rule alterability was coded 0
(OK) or 1 (not OK). A child’s criterion judgment score for a story type
was his or her mean score for stories of that type. Higher scores indi-
cated that children considered rules more absolute.
Reliability and Consistency
Coding reliability was assessed by randomly selecting a subsample
of 20 (15.5%) of the interviews for recoding by a second judge. Inter-
judge reliability ranged from 94.8% to 100%, with a mean of 98.9%.
The overall internal consistency across all eight story types and
four scales (i.e., 32 judgments) was high (Cronbach’s   .93). Taking
each of the eight story types separately, internal consistency across the
four criterion judgment scales ranged from .73 to .78. The internal
consistency of each of the four scales across the eight story types
ranged from .83 to .90.
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Results
The children’s mean scores on each of the four criterion judgments
for each of the eight story types are presented in Table 1. Figure 1
shows their mean scores on judgments of source of rule, and Figure 2
on judgments of status of agent.
A mixed 4 (source of rule) x 2 (status of agent of transgression or
alteration) x 2 (gender of participant) x 3 (age group of participant)
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with repeated measures
on source and status was carried out on responses to the four criterion
judgment scales. The MANOVA revealed a significant main effect of
source of rule (F(12, 112)  22.10, p  .001, partial 2  .70). Children
distinguished between the rules of different sources on all four criteria:
permissibility (F(3, 124)  58.25, p  .001, partial 2  .32), authority
contingency (F(3, 124)  31.73, p  .001, partial 2  .21), rule con-
tingency (F(3, 124)  88.77, p  .001, partial 2  .42), and alterability
(F(3, 124)  71.63, p  .001, partial 2  .37). In this and other multi-
ple comparisons, post hoc analyses of significant effects were con-
ducted using Tukey HSD tests. Moral rules were judged more absolute
on all four criterion judgments than any of the three sources of con-
vention (ps  .01), except that there was no significant difference
between the children’s judgments of the alterability of morals and cul-
tural conventions. Cultural conventions were judged to be more
absolute on all criterion judgments than adult- or child-invented con-
ventions, and adult-invented conventions were considered less alterable
than child-invented conventions (ps  .01).
There was also a significant main effect of status of agent of trans-
gression or alteration (F(4, 120)  15.05, p  .001, partial 2  .33).
The children judged rules to be considerably less alterable (F(1, 126) 
58.71, p  .001, partial 2  .32) and slightly less violable (F(1, 126)
 7.33, p  .01, partial 2  .06) and authority contingent (F(1, 126)
 5.46, p  .02, partial 2  .04) when the agent was a child than
when the agent was an adult.
The interaction between source and agent was significant (F(12,
112)  6.83, p  .001, partial 2  .42). This was due to a difference in
judgments of alterability (F(3, 124)  21.77, p  .001, partial 2  .15)
and a small difference in judgments of permissibility (F(3, 124)  2.66,
p  .048, partial 2  .02). Only violations and changes of adult-
invented conventions, and changes of morals, were judged to be less
acceptable when the agents were children than when they were adults
(ps  .05): alteration of adult-invented conventions by children was
considered to be as unacceptable as children’s alteration of cultural
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Figure 1. Criterion judgments by source of rule.
Figure 2. Criterion judgments by status of agent.
conventions and morals. Adults were judged no more able to break and
change child-invented conventions than their own conventions.
The MANOVA also revealed that the main effect of age of respon-
dent was significant (F(8, 240)  6.61, p  .001, partial 2  .18). Uni-
variate analyses showed that this was due to age-related differences in
judgments of rule contingency (F(2, 123)  14.04, p  .001, partial 2
 .19). The 4–5-year-olds were found to judge transgressions to be less
rule contingent than did either of the other age groups (ps  .003).
There was a significant interaction between rule source and age
(F(24, 224)  3.43, p  .001, partial 2  .27). This reflected differ-
ences in children’s judgments on all four criterion judgments: permissi-
bility (F(6, 248)  3.78, p  .001, partial 2  .06); authority contin-
gency (F(6, 248)  2.25, p  .04, partial 2  .04); rule contingency
(F(6, 248)  7.40, p  .001, partial 2  .11); and alterability (F(6, 248)
 8.39, p  .001, partial 2  .12). Children of all three age-groups
said that, by all four criteria, morals were more absolute than adult-
and child-invented conventions (ps  .01), but the 4–5-year-olds did
not distinguish significantly between morals and cultural conventions.
In contrast, the 6–7-year-olds judged morals to be less authority con-
tingent (and, nonsignificantly, less permissible and rule contingent)
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than cultural conventions (p  .05), and the 8–9-year-olds considered
morals less violable, authority contingent, and rule contingent (and,
nonsignificantly, less alterable) than cultural conventions (ps  .05).
Another difference between age-groups was that, whereas the 4–5 and
6–7-year-old children judged cultural conventions more absolute by all
criteria than adult-invented conventions (ps  .01), the 8–9-year-olds
distinguished between these conventions only in terms of alterability
and rule contingency (ps  .01). Furthermore, although children of all
age-groups judged cultural conventions to be more absolute by all cri-
teria than child-invented conventions (ps  .01), the 4–5-year-olds did
not distinguish between adult- and child-invented conventions. The
6–7 and 8–9-year-olds judged adult-invented conventions to be less
alterable than child-invented conventions (ps  .01), and the 8–9-year-
olds—but not the 4–7-year-olds—also considered transgressions of
adult-invented conventions less permissible, authority and rule contin-
gent than transgressions of child-invented conventions (ps  .05).
The interaction between agent of transgression or alteration and
age of respondent was significant (F(8, 240)  2.14, p  .03, partial 2
 .07). This was due to differences in judgments of alterability (F(2,
126)  7.64, p  .001, partial 2  .11): it was only the 6–7 and 8–9-
year-olds who judged alterations by children to be less acceptable than
by adults (ps  .05).
There was also a significant interaction between source, agent, and
age (F(24, 224)  1.70, p  .03, partial 2  .15). This reflected differ-
ences in judgments of alterability (F(6, 248)  2.89, p  .01, partial 2
 .05). The 4–5-year-olds said that adults’ alterations of adult-
invented and child-invented conventions, and children’s alterations of
child-invented conventions, were less acceptable than did the 6–9-year-
olds (ps  .01). In contrast to the 6–9-year-olds, the youngest children
considered adults’ changes of adult-invented conventions to be as
unacceptable as adults’ changes of morals, and neither adults’ nor chil-
dren’s alterations of children’s conventions to be any more acceptable
than their alterations of adults’ conventions.
The main effect of gender, and interactions between gender and
other variables, were all nonsignificant.
The influence of the content of individual stories on children’s
judgments was investigated by comparing the criterion judgments for
each of the stories, regardless of the status of inventors and transgres-
sors. These are shown in Table 2. One moral rule (pushing) was consid-
ered more absolute (i.e., had higher mean criterion judgment) than all
the cultural conventions (ts  2.48, ps  .02), and two other morals
(inappropriate blaming and stealing money) were judged to be more
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absolute than all cultural conventions except two (ts  2.26, ps  .02).
These two cultural conventions were swearing and using the wrong
lavatory, both of which were considered to be more absolute than the
morals of helping someone who had fallen over and sharing (ts  2.79,
ps  .01). This latter moral was not judged to be more absolute than
any cultural convention.
Most of the cultural conventions were judged to be more absolute
than most of the conventions that were invented by adults and chil-
dren. Swearing, using the wrong lavatory, and undressing in public
were all considered more absolute than all the invented conventions (ts
 2.78, ps  .01). The highest rated invented convention (sitting in a
designated place) was considered less absolute than all cultural conven-
tions (ts  2.31, ps  .03) except saying “please” and wearing shoes in
a restaurant.
Discussion
Consistent with the first hypothesis and the findings of the domain
theorists, children distinguished between moral and conventional rules.
Morals were considered less violable, authority contingent, rule con-
tingent, and alterable than all three kinds of conventions, with the sin-
gle exception that cultural conventions were not judged to be signifi-
cantly more alterable than morals.
As well as the social domain of rules being influential in chil-
dren’s judgments, so too was the social status (adult or child) of the
people who invented, transgressed, or changed the rules; the second
hypothesis, then, was also supported. When adults were the agents,
rules were judged to be considerably more alterable and slightly more
violable and authority contingent than when the transgressors or
changers were children. Adult-invented conventions were considered
less alterable than child-invented conventions. Status was especially
important when the rules were invented by adults and changed by
children: These alterations were regarded as no more acceptable than
changes of morals. Indeed, by the criterion of alterability, the influ-
ence of social status on the participants’ judgments was greater than
that of social domain.
The participants considered adults’ transgressions and alterations
of adult-invented conventions to be relatively acceptable on all four
criterion judgments. Similarly, they said that children could break or
change the child-invented conventions. Indeed, children were consid-
ered to have as much authority to break and change child-invented
rules as have adults. These findings are consistent with Laupa and her
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colleagues’ (Laupa, 1991, 1995; Laupa & Turiel, 1986, 1993; Tisak et
al., 2000) view that social position—as opposed to adulthood per se—
is an important determinant of children’s social judgments. When
children invent rules, they construct contexts in which they are in posi-
tions of authority (Nobes, 1999). Within these contexts, adults have
no special position that enables them legitimately to break or change
the rules.
There were considerable differences between the judgments of chil-
dren of different ages. Consistent with predictions, and with the find-
ings of previous researchers (e.g., Laupa, 1995; Shantz, 1982; Tisak &
Turiel, 1988; Tisak et al., 2000), older children tended to distinguish
more clearly than younger children between rules according to
domain. This was also found to be the case with the status of rule
inventors, transgressors, and changers. In contrast to the 6–9-year-
olds, the youngest children did not differentiate morals from cultural
conventions, nor adult-invented conventions from child-invented con-
ventions, by any criterion. Neither did these 4–5-year-olds significantly
distinguish between the rule contingency of the four sources of rules,
nor between alterations by adults and by children.
It is possible that the youngest children’s failure to differentiate as
well as older children was at least partly due to their not adequately
understanding some of the questions. Other researchers have reported
similar problems: Tisak and Turiel (1988), for example, found that
their 1st graders, who were older than our youngest group, found the
rule contingency question too difficult.
The use of relatively large numbers of rules of each source in this
study (i.e., 6 morals, 6 cultural conventions, and 12 invented conven-
tions) revealed a high degree of variation in children’s criterion judg-
ments within, as well as between, rule sources. Some of the cultural
conventions were considered more absolute than some morals. These
findings indicate that story content has a significant influence on
children’s judgments. They suggest that it is important that
researchers in this field consider the content of the stories they use,
for it is possible that their findings might sometimes reflect the influ-
ence of story content rather than, say, the influence of domain or sta-
tus. Indeed, our own conclusions might have been different—for
example, we could have found a clearer moral/conventional distinc-
tion, or none at all—had we chosen to use only certain moral and
conventional stories.
Contrary to expectations, cultural conventions were judged on all
four criterion judgments to be more absolute than adult-invented con-
ventions. Younger children were more likely to make this distinction
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than older. Since cultural conventions are invented and enforced by
adults, children were not expected to distinguish them from adult-
invented conventions. This finding might be another result of the chil-
dren’s recognition that people—whether adults or children—hold posi-
tions of authority only in certain contexts, such as when they have been
involved in inventing rules for their own school, family, or peer group.
The cultural conventions might, then, have been seen to be beyond the
jurisdiction even of the adults in the stories because the adults did not
hold legitimate positions of authority regarding the rules of the wider
culture.
An alternative explanation relates to the issue of story content,
since it is likely that most of the cultural conventions used in this study
concerned more serious issues than the newly invented rules. Moreover,
transgressions of several of the cultural conventions might be consid-
ered to be second-order events (Turiel, 1983) because they overlap with
the moral domain in that they would lead to other people being upset
or distressed. Indeed, the cultural conventions that children rated most
absolute—swearing, taking clothes off in public, and a male using a
females’ lavatory—might all have been interpreted by children as acts
that were likely to cause distress. Similarly, the rule of sharing, which
many children considered to be less absolute than several cultural con-
ventions, might have been interpreted as belonging in the personal,
rather than the moral, domain; that is, children might have judged
whether to share biscuits with others to be a matter of personal choice.
Our results suggest that judgments of alterability differ from other
criterion judgments. The children distinguished between morals and
conventions, but not between adult- and child-invented conventions, in
terms of permissibility, rule contingency, and authority contingency;
in contrast, morals and cultural conventions were not distinguished by
children regarding alterability, but adult- and child-invented conven-
tions were. Furthermore, although children’s judgments of permissibil-
ity and authority contingency were only slightly influenced by the sta-
tus of transgressor, children considered alterations of rules by adults to
be very much more acceptable than alterations of rules by children.
These differences occurred primarily because children judged alter-
ations of adult-invented conventions by children to be unacceptable or
impossible.
Perhaps the differences between children’s judgments of alterabil-
ity and of other criteria are to be explained in terms of children’s likely
experiences of breaking and changing rules: By midchildhood, most
children will have broken adults’ rules, and invented and changed their
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own. They will know that adults break and change rules, too. However,
children are very rarely given the opportunity to alter adults’ rules.
These judgments, then, accurately and realistically reflect their experi-
ences and knowledge of the social world.
These results concerning judgments of alterability support
Piaget’s (1932/1968) finding that children consider changes of elders’
rules by children to be unacceptable or impossible. Indeed, they are
consistent with his claim that children’s conceptions of rules are to be
understood partly in terms of the inequality in status between adults
and children. Similarly, Davidson et al. (1983) report that children
judge children’s alterations of conventions to be as unacceptable as
children’s alterations of morals. But the present data also concur with
Davidson et al.’s finding that, at least from the age of 6 years, chil-
dren say that conventions can be changed: Our results reveal that
6–9-year-old children understand that children can alter their own
conventions, and that adults can change theirs. And, consistent with
the large majority of findings reported by the domain theorists, chil-
dren distinguished between transgressions (as opposed to alterations)
by the criteria of permissibility and contingency according to
domain. None of these latter findings would have been predicted by
Piaget: They show status is an important factor in children’s judg-
ments, but not for the reasons he proposed. Children are not het-
eronomous, nor do they have unilateral respect for adulthood per se.
Instead, the evidence from this and other studies indicates that chil-
dren respect adults’ status and rules because they realistically
appraise adults’ competence and positions of authority in social
organizations.
The apparently contradictory findings of Piaget and the domain
theorists might stem from the different emphases they have placed on
the various criterion judgments. For Piaget, the key criterion by
which to assess children’s concepts of social rules was alterability. As
we have reported, children’s judgments by this criterion appear to dif-
fer from those by other criteria such as permissibility, authority con-
tingency, and rule contingency. In contrast, Turiel and his colleagues
have focused on these other criterion judgments. Here, then, is an
explanation of Piaget’s findings that led him erroneously to conclude
that children are heteronomous. Had he focused on criterion judg-
ments other than alterability, or asked about children’s changes of
children’s rules, or adults’ changes of adults’ rules, he might well have
come to very different conclusions about children’s conceptions of
rules.
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Children have been asked about the alterability of morals and
conventions in only a few of the domain theorists’ studies.7 Some
researchers have asked whether the rules could be changed by adult
authorities (Nucci and Turiel (1993) asked about ministers and the
congregation of a church changing church rules) or by society
(Lockhart, Abrahams, & Osherson, 1977). Like Davidson et al.
(1983), Buchanan-Barrow and Barrett (1998) posed a general ques-
tion (“Do you think this rule could be changed?”) without specify-
ing who made the changes. And, as in the present study and David-
son et al.’s, Smetana (1986) asked children about stories in which
changes were made by children. In contrast to Davidson et al.’s and
our findings, Smetana found that children considered the conven-
tions more alterable than the morals. The explanation for this dis-
crepancy might be found in the content of the stories used in the
different studies. Smetana asked children about two morals—hit-
ting another child and taking another child’s toy—and two conven-
tions—wearing a swimsuit to day care and not sitting in one’s seat
during snack. The mean alterability judgment for the morals (con-
verted to allow comparison with our data) was .73, and for the con-
ventions .54. The mean alterability judgments of similar stories in
the present study (pushing and stealing, and wearing the wrong
color clothes and sitting in the wrong seat in a bus) were .84 for
morals and .53 for conventions. These means are significantly dif-
ferent (t (95)  5.65, p  .001). It seems likely, then, that the dis-
crepancy between the findings of Davidson et al. (1983) and those
of the present study on the one hand, and Smetana’s (1986) findings
on the other, reflects the content of the stories chosen by these dif-
ferent researchers. This comparison illustrates the point that story
content can have a substantial impact on children’s judgments,
independent of domain and status, and can influence researchers’
findings and conclusions accordingly.
Together, the findings of these and the present studies suggest that,
when it is not specified who changes rules, children recognize that con-
ventions, but not morals, can be changed. Also, they think that adult
authorities such as church ministers, and a whole society, can change
conventions. But the present findings indicate that children think that a
7 Of the 23 published studies of criterion judgment reported in Helwig, Tisak and
Turiel’s (1990) review, only four compared children’s judgments of the alterability of morals
and conventions and found differences in the predicted direction. The Davidson et al. (1983)
study is the only one in which children were asked about children’s alterations of rules.
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small group of adults cannot change the rules of the wider society, pre-
sumably because they have no authority to do so, and that children
cannot change adults’ rules.
In summary, the findings of this study indicate that children’s
reasoning about social rules is influenced by a number of interacting
factors. These include, first, the domain of the rule that is broken or
altered: Morals are more absolute than conventions. Second, the sta-
tus of the inventor, transgressor, or changer of the rule: Transgres-
sions and alterations by adults are considered more legitimate than
are violations and changes by children, and alterations of adult-
invented rules are less acceptable than alterations of child-invented
rules. There was evidence that the adults’ authority derived more
from their positions of authority than from their adulthood per se.
Third, the criterion by which actions are judged: Children appear to
be less sensitive to domain, and more sensitive to status, when asked
about alterability than when they make other criterion judgments.
Fourth, the content of stories: There is wide variation in children’s
conceptions of rules even of the same domain or source. And fifth,
children’s ages: Older children distinguish more clearly than younger
children both with regards to domain and to status of inventor,
transgressor, or changer of rules. With age, children’s understanding
of the social world becomes increasingly sophisticated and differen-
tiated.
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